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On the Importance of Institutions: Review of
Arbitral Awards for Legal Errors
Peter

BOWMAN RUTLEDGE*

One of the distinctive features of arbitration is the limited opportunity for judicial
review of arbitral awards. Arbitration laws generally contain quite a narrow set of
grounds upon which a reviewing court may vacate the arbitral award. Likewise, the
major multilateral treaties governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards restrict the grounds for review. As one example, arbitral awards, unlike
ordinary court judgments, are not reviewable for errors of law.
Against this tradition of limited judicial review and, specifically, nonreviewability for legal errors, the United States stands as an exception. The Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), governing virtually all international arbitrations conducted in
the United States, does not explicitly authorize judicial review of arbitral awards for
legal errors. Despite this textual gap, federal courts have developed a doctrine
permitting vacatur of arbitral awards where the arbitrator has rendered an award in
"manifest disregard of the law." In a similar vein, courts have generally enforced
parties' efforts to provide for judicial review of awards for legal errors in their
arbitration agreements. In a few instances, states have modified their own arbitration
laws to provide for court review of such errors or to allow parties to opt into such
systems of expanded judicial review.
In light of these exceptional features, judicial review of arbitral awards for legal
errors has attracted substantial attention in both the case law and commentary. Many
scholars and courts have vigorously defended some level ofjudicial policing in order to
prevent gross legal errors from going uncorrected. Some have lauded the concept
while proposing alternative standards of review. A few have questioned the wisdom or
validity ofjudicial review for legal errors altogether.
Participants in this debate have ignored a second-order issue. The debate over the
desirability of judicial review of arbitral awards for legal errors, or any system of
secondary review, reflects a recognition about the trade-offl involved in providing a
further avenue of relief from an adverse decision. Recourse may provide some
heightened degree of assurance that the "right" result has been reached. At the same
time, it unquestionably increases the overall costs of the system and decreases the
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speediness of the process, contrary to the purported virtues of arbitration. Recognizing
that these trade-offi must inevitably occur, the question arises: who shall make them?
Thus, quite apart from whether courts should review arbitral awards for legal errors, a
separate question arises over who should define that role.' Shall courts spontaneously
generate a doctrine of judicial review for legal errors in their own case law? Shall the
burden fall to parties explicitly to provide for it in their arbitration agreements? Or is
the decision about the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards a quintessentially
legislative function? While some scholarship has touched on the edges of this issue, no
one has provided a systematic treatment of this underlying institutional question. This
article attempts to fill that gap.
In my view, legislatures, rather than courts or parties, should decide whether (and
to what extent) courts should review arbitral awards for errors of law. The optimal
legislative mechanism should not be compulsory but should offer parties the choice
whether to "opt-in" to this regime of expanded review by inserting language to that
effect in their arbitration agreement. A legislative solution with an "opt-in" feature has
a sounder doctrinal foundation, better respects the distribution of power between
various branches of government, involves a lower risk of error and minimizes
transaction costs. From this position, two additional conclusions follow: first, courts
should not review arbitral awards for manifest disregard of the law; secondly, courts
should not enforce party-based expansions of the grounds for judicial review of arbitral
awards.
The article develops this thesis in three sections. The first section introduces the
law in the United States on judicial review of arbitral awards for legal errors. It focuses
on the interpretation of the FAA by the federal courts, which have given the most
complete treatment to this issue, and also draws on examples from other countries'
arbitration laws and those of individual states. The second section analyses the relative
advantages and disadvantages of vesting courts, parties or legislatures with the power to
regulate judicial review of arbitral awards for legal errors. The final section explores the
conclusions of this analysis and sketches a future research agenda.
I.

BACKGROUND AND DOCTRINE

After an arbitral tribunal has rendered an award, three outcomes are possible. First,
2
the losing party may (and most often does) comply voluntarily with the award.
Secondly, the prevailing party may seek confirmation, recognition or enforcement of
the award; in international arbitration, this typically occurs in a jurisdiction where the
I A further institutional issue is the extent to which courts, rather than some other body such as an appellate
arbitral tribunal, should conduct this review for legal error. See, e.g. Greek Code of Civil Procedure, art. 895
(allowing the parties to arrange for appellate arbitral panels); Arbitration Rules of ICSID (W. Bank) 50-55
(providing for substantive review of arbitral awards by a committee of arbitrators). That question, though
interesting in its own right, is beyond the scope of this article.
2 See Pierre Lalive, Enforcing Awards, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: 60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 317, 319 (1984) (high rate ofvoluntary compliance with ICC awards).
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losing party has assets. Thirdly, the losing party may seek to vacate the award; in
international arbitration, this occurs almost always in the jurisdiction where the arbitral
3
award has been rendered.
In the latter case, the law of the arbitral situs identifies the grounds upon which an
arbitral award can be vacated. A court reviews an arbitrator's award narrowly, in
contrast to an appellate court's more comprehensive scrutiny of a trial court's
judgment. For example, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration
(UNCITRAL Model Law), the source for many national arbitration laws, provides
that awards may be set aside only due to a party's incapacity, invalidity of the
arbitration agreement, inadequate notice or opportunity to be heard, determinations
beyond those submitted by the parties, an improperly constituted tribunal, nonarbitrability of the subject matter or an award incompatible with the public policy of
the arbitral forum. 4 Other laws, such as the Swiss Private International Law Act or the
Austrian Code of Civil Procedure contain similarly narrow grounds upon which an
award can be set aside.5 One noteworthy feature of these systems of review, as with the
arbitration laws of most countries, is that they do not explicitly provide for vacatur of
6
the arbitral award in case of legal error.
At first glance, the regime in the United States would appear to be no different.
Like many national arbitration laws, the FAA contains extremely narrow grounds upon
which an arbitral award can be set aside.7 In the case of domestic awards (i.e., in
arbitrations held in the United States exclusively between U.S. citizens and not
involving property or performance abroad), chapter 1 of the FAA governs. 8 In relevant
part, section 10(a) provides that, upon application by a party, an arbitral award may be
vacated:

3 In certain cases of international arbitration, it may be possible to seek vacatur in more than one
jurisdiction. Art. V(1)(e) of the New York Convention allows for this possibility by providing that enforcement
may be denied if the award has been vacated "by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law
of which, that award was made." United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention"), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997
(emphasis added); see also Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration ("Panama
Convention"), Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975), art. V(1)(e) (providing for the same);
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration ("European Convention"), April 21, 1961, 484
U.N.T.S. 364, No. 7041, art. IX.1 (similarly allowing for vacatur in either location). In practice, however, this
choice has litte consequence.
4 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 34; on the widespread adoption
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, see GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL. ARBITRATION 31 (2d ed.,
2000).
5 Swiss I.RR.G., art. 190; Zivilprozessordnung [Z.P.O.] S 595(1) (Aw.).
6 For examples of national arbitration laws providing for more intrusive judicial review of arbitral awards, see,
e.g.,Argentine Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure, art. 758; Civil Procedure Code of Iraq Law No. 83 of
1969, art. 273; English Arbitration Act 1996, S 69 (permitting appeals on points of law under certain
circumstances); Swiss Intercantonal Arbitration Convention, art. 36 (permitting annulment where an award based
on erroneous factual findings or constitutes "a clear violation of law or equity"); see generally Born, supra note 4,
at 795-814; Daniel M. Kolkey, Attaching Arbitral Awards: Rights of Appeal and Review in InternationalArbitrations, 22

INT'L L. 693 (1988).
9 U.S.C. § 2, 202. Some states have enacted their own international Arbitration Acts, which the parties
may choose or which may be applicable in rare circumstances. See Born, supra note 4, at 40-41 and note 236.
B See 9 U.S.C. SS 202, 302 (differentiating between domestic and non-domestic awards).
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1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them;
3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehaviour by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made 9
Section 10(a) does not list legal error among the grounds for vacatur.
In international arbitrations, the legal regime in the United States is more
complicated but fundamentally no different with respect to judicial review of arbitral
awards for legal error. The United States is a signatory to several treaties governing the
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, including the 1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("the
New York Convention") and the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration ("the Panama Convention"). 10 These treaties cover two types
of awards: "foreign" awards (i.e., certain awards rendered by an arbitral tribunal sitting
in a third country which is a signatory to a treaty) and "non-domestic" awards (i.e.,
certain awards rendered by an arbitral tribunal sitting in the United States in an
arbitration involving at least one foreign party, property or performance abroad or
otherwise, which have a "reasonable relation" to one or more foreign states)."
Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA, implementing the New York and Panama Conventions
respectively, provide that, upon application, a court "shall confirm" an award "unless it
finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the said Convention.' 1 2 That implementing legislation, however,
further provides that chapter 1 (which includes section 10, quoted above) shall apply to
actions and proceedings "to the extent that [it] is not in conflict with" the
implementing legislation or the treaties themselves.' 3 These two passages create an
interpretive puzzle: are the broader grounds for vacatur under chapter 1 "in conflict
with" the narrower ones contained in the Conventions? Or do they merely

9 9 U.S.C. S 10.
SS 201-208 (New York Convention); id. § 301-307 (Panama Convention).
" See New York Convention, art. 1.1; 9 U.S.C. S 202, 302. For background on the New York Convention,
see generally ALBEPT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YOPRK CONW-TON OF 1958 passim (1981).
12 Those grounds include, principally, a party's lack of capacity, the arbitration agreement's invalidity,
inadequate notice, improperly constituted tribunal, improper determination by the tribunal, non-arbitrability and
public policy. See 9 U.S.C. § 207, 302; see also New York Convention, art. V; Panama Convention, art. 5. On
the relationship between the concepts of vacatur, confirmation, recognition and enforcement, see W. MICHAEL
10 9 U.S.C.

REISMAN et al., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 971-972 (1997).
13 9 U.S.C. SS 208, 307.
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supplement those grounds and, therefore, apply to awards falling under the
Conventions? As a result of this interpretive puzzle, in the case of "non-domestic"
awards made in the United States and falling under one of the Conventions, federal
courts disagree over the grounds governing judicial review. 14 Some courts hold that
the applicable treaty provides the exclusive grounds for review;I s other courts hold that
the grounds for review of such awards are identical to those governing domestic
awards, described in the preceding paragraph. 16 Regardless of whether the
Conventions provide the exclusive grounds for review or the FAA grounds are also
available, neither regime explicitly permits judicial review of awards in international
17
arbitrations for legal error.
Despite the absence of a clear textual mandate, both courts and parties in the
United States have developed various mechanisms to expand the grounds for judicial
review of arbitral awards beyond those explicitly provided for in the FAA.
Additionally, state law-makers have proposed and enacted some reforms incorporating
some form of merits-based review.
From the judicial corner, federal courts have developed various non-statutory
grounds upon which an award may be set aside. Most significantly, federal courts in the
United States have developed a doctrine under which courts may vacate an arbitral
award where the arbitrator has rendered the award in manifest disregard of the law.18
This "manifest disregard of the law" standard first appeared in a Supreme Court
decision following the enactment of the FAA as the court struggled to reconcile the
FAA's pro-arbitration policy with federal statutory schemes apparently favoring dispute
resolution in a judicial forum. 19 While adopting this common standard, the appellate

14 See Born, supra note 4, at 727-728 (discussing the debate); for a thoughtfil discussion in the case law, see
Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Inv., Inc., 107 E3d 476, 480-482 (CA7 1997). This issue, moreover, is distinct from the
issue of whether a convention provides the exclusive grounds for denying recognition or enforcement of an award
rendered abroad and falling under it. On this point, the case law more consistently holds that the applicable
convention's grounds are exclusive. See, e.g., M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., KG, 87 E3d 844,
850-851 (CA6 1996). But see Abdullah E. A1-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 E3d 680 (CADC 1996) (apparently
applying chapter 1 of the FAA to award rendered in England in arbitration between foreign parties); see generally
Born, supra note 4, at 792-793, 809; ANDP.EAs E LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION

363 (1993).
1" E.g., Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehonffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1445-1447 (CAll
1998).
1" E.g., Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons WL.L. v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 E3d 15, 18 (CA2 1997); In Re
Arbitration Between Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Int'l Ltd., 888 E.2d 260, 264-265
(CA2 1989); see also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932-934 (CA2 1983) (applying the New
York Convention to arbitration held in New York between foreign parties).
17 In the exceptional case of non-domestic awards not falling under either the New York or the Panama
Conventions, chapter 1 of the FAA (and thus the vacatur grounds contained in S 10) would govern. See Born,
supra note 4, at 887.
I' See, e.g., Flex-Foot, Inc. v. Phillips, No. 99-1489, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 1432, at *7-8 (CAFC Feb. 2,
2001); Apex Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. U.S. Supply Co., Inc., 142 E3d 188, 193 (CA4 1998); see generally Born,
supra note 4, at 810-812 (collecting cases).
19 See Born, supra note 4, at 797-798; see text accompanying notes 40-49.
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courts have elaborated on it in various ways. 20 Under the predominant view, an
arbitrator manifestly disregards the law when (a) a case is governed by a clearly defined
applicable legal principle and (b) the arbitrator consciously refused to heed it. 2' In cases
where an arbitrator has not provided any reasons for his award, a reviewing court
generally will not vacate it for manifest disregard of the law if there is any rational basis
upon which the award can be sustained. 22 Scholars and practitioners have commented
extensively on the merits, the formulation, and the basis for this "manifest disregard of
23
the law" standard.
Alongside the manifest disregard of the law doctrine, parties themselves sometimes
provide in their arbitration agreements for judicial review of arbitral awards for legal
errors. Such arbitration agreements may specify a more exacting standard of review
than the "manifest disregard of the law" standard. For example, one arbitration
agreement provided that, "The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award:
(i)
based upon any of the grounds referred to in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii) where
the arbitrators' findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii) where
24
the arbitrators' conclusions of law are erroneous.
As a result of such clauses, an increasing number of appellate courts have begun to
consider whether parties may legally expand the grounds upon which courts shall

2oSee, e.g., Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 761 n.2 (CA5 1999) (describing
formulations); Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 E3d 1465, 1487 n.20 (CADC 1997) (same).
21E.g., Hoffnan v. Cargill, Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (CA8 2001); Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669
(CA6 2000); DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (CA2 1997); National Wrecking Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957 (CA7 1993); Folkways Music Publishers, Inc.
v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111-12 (CA2 1993); see generally Born, supra note 4, at 811.
22 E.g., Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 E3d 9 (CA2 1997).
23Glower W Jones, Grounds for Confirming and Vacating Awards, paper delivered at the Center for
International Legal Studies' Superconference on International Commercial and Construction Arbitration (une
15-18, 2000) (copy on file with author); Paul Turner, Preemption: he United States Arbitration Act, the Manifest
L. REv. 519 (1999); Norman S.
Disregard of the Law Testfor Vacating an Arbitration Award, and State Courts, 26 PEwP.
Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of theLau 64 BPOOK.YN L. REv. 471 (Summer
1998); Hans Smit, Is Manifest Disregardof theLaw or the Evidence or Both a Groundfor Vacatur of an ArbitralAward?,
8 AM. REv. INT'L AssB. 341 (1997); Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of theLaw is No Excuse:Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 49 (1997); Marcus Mungioli, Comment, The Manifest Disregard of the Law
Standard: A Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal Arbitration Act, 31 St. MARY'S L. J. 1079 (2000); Adam Milam,
Comment, A House Built on Sand: Vacating Arbitration Awards for Manifest Disregard of the Law, 29 CUM. L. REv.
705 (1999); Mark B. Rees, Comment, Halligan v. Piper Jaffray: The Collision Between Arbitral Autonomy and Judicial
Review, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 347 (1997); Michael P. O'Mullan, Note, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of
Securities Arbitration: An Analysis of the Manifest Disregardof the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1121 (1995);
Marta B. Varela, Arbitration and the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard,49 Disp. RESOL. L. J. 64 (June 1994); Brad A.
Galbraith, Vacatur of CommercialArbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplatingthe Use and Utility of the "Manifest
Disregard" of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. Rev. 241 (1993); Note, Manifest Disregard of the Law in International
CommercialArbitration, 28 COLUM. J. TRANs. L. 449 (1990); NoteJudicialReview of Arbitration Awards on the Merits,
63 HAP.M L. REv. 681 (1950).
24 Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 E3d 884 (CA9 1997).
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review an arbitral award. 25 Until recently, though the cases strongly suggested some
differences of opinion over the enforceability of such agreements, no clear conflict of
authority had emerged among the federal appellate courts. As a result of a recent
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the federal courts of
appeals are now divided explicitly over the enforceability of such party-based
expansions of the grounds for judicial review. 26 Like the courts, both scholars and
practitioners are divided over the enforceability and advisability of such clauses. 27
Finally, apart from the judicial and party-driven developments, some legislative
models and innovations provide a third means through which courts may be
authorized to review arbitral awards for legal errors. For example, New Jersey has
enacted an optional dispute resolution regime, into which parties may "opt-in" and
thereby authorize judicial review of an award for legal errors. 28 Additionally, the
drafters of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act recently considered (though they
ultimately rejected) such a proposal. 29 A few scattered examples also exist under
specialized arbitration regimes. 30 These legislative models provide a third mechanism
for authorizing judicial review of arbitration awards for legal error.

2 UHC Management Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 148 E3d 992 (CA8 1998); Lapine Tech. Corp.,
130 E3d 884; Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248 (CA4 Aug. 11, 1997) (per curiam)
(unpub. mem.); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 E3d 993 (CA5 1995);
Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 E2d 1501 (CA7 1991). See also New
England Utils. v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 ESupp.2d 53 (D. Mass. 1998); In re Arbitration between Fils et Cables
d'Acier de Lens and Midland Metals Corp., 584 E Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). For state court decisions, see,
e.g., Northern Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist. v. Chicago Southshore and South Bend R.R., 661 N.E.2d 842 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996); Primerica Fin. Servs. v. Wise, 456 S.E.2d 631 (Ga. App. 1995); Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W2d 185
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 640 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1994); NAB
Constr. Corp. v. Metropolitan Trans. Auth., 579 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); South Wash. Assocs. v.
Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blas6, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992); Konicki v.
Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1333 (1982). See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, ManagerialLitigants?
The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1249 note 227 (Aug. 2000)
(collecting cases); Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope ofJudicialReview ofArbitration Awards, 63 ALB.
L. Rev. 241, 257-258 and notes 110-112 (1999); Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract
Model of Arbitration, 74 "IJL. L. REv. 39, 60 note 108 (Winter 1999) (collecting cases).
26 Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (CA1O 2001).
27 See, e.g., Born, supra note 4, at 814; Cole, supra note 25, at 1232-1263 (Aug. 2000); Younger, supra note
25, at 241; Brunet, supra note 25, at 65-84; Andreas Lowenfeld, Can Arbitration Coexist with Judicial Review? A
Critique of LaPine v. Kyocera, ADR CUPENTS 1 (Sept. 1998); Hans Smit, ContractualModification of the Scope of
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 Am. REV. INT'L AR". 147 (1997); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting out of the
Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L AR. 225 (1997); THOMAS E. CARkONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITPATION 174 (1997); Tom Cullinan, Note, Contractingfor an Expanded Scope ofjudicial Review in

Arbitration Agreements, 51 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1998); Caroll E. Neesemann, ContractingforJudicialReview: Goodfor
Arbitration, DiSp. RESOL. MAG. 18, 19 (Fall 1998); Abby Cohen Smutny, Comment on tile Ninth Circuit Decision in
Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., INT'L AR.B. REP. 18, 22 (Feb. 1998).
20 N.J. Stat. Rev. SS 2A:23A-13 (1999).
2 Report No. 4 of the Drafting Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws relating to the Uniform Arbitration Act (Dec. 15, 1998) (available at <www.abanet.org/litigation/
committee/alternative/arbrep6.htnl>). For a discussion of the legislative history of this proposal, see Brunet, supra
note 25, at 59-61 and n. 107. Similar options include rent-a-judge programs available under various state laws.
Under these programs, the parties may present their dispute to a private referee, often a retired state judge, whose
decision is then subject to judicial review. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code SS 638-645; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. SS 151.001-151.013.
30 See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Cont. Code §10240.12 (permitting certain awards in public contracts disputes to be
vacated where not supported by substantial evidence or not decided under or in accordance with Californian law).
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Traditionally, the arbitration literature has treated these judicial, contractual and
legislative models in isolation from one another. 31 This separate treatment is a mistake.
Each of these models attempts to address, in different forms, a common issue: whether
and how rigorously courts should review arbitral awards for legal error. What
distinguishes the models from one another is the institution responsible for vesting
courts with that power. When these models are considered alongside one another, the
resulting analysis demonstrates the importance of the choice of institution for the
development of a legal rule. 32 The next section of this article analyses the choice of
institution.
II.

COURTS, PARTIES OR LEGISLATURES?

Assuming that judicial review of arbitral awards for legal error is a good idea, who
should decide the nature and scope of that review? At least three institutions are
possible candidates: the courts, the parties and the legislature. 33 Focusing on the FAA,
this section evaluates the consequences of allowing each of these institutions to decide
whether and how courts should review arbitral awards for legal error. In order to
accentuate the comparison between institutions, this article does not organize the
analysis around the institutions themselves but, instead, around various factors. These
factors include legitimacy, error costs and transaction costs. Each subsection first
introduces the factor, then assesses how each institution fares relative to the others
under it. The end of this section summarizes the results of the analysis.
Two methodological points should be made at the outset of the analysis. First,
while I have tried to separate the question of the desirability of judicial review of
arbitral-awards for legal error from the question of which institution should authorize
that review, those two questions can dovetail. Secondly, aspects of the critique may
apply to more than one institution (i.e., critiques about judicial standards often apply to
legislative ones). In order to avoid redundancy, I have located the relevant critique in
the discussion of one institution and have identified any variations in the analysis of the
other relevant institution.

31 For an exceptional effort to link these institutional alternatives, see Born, supra note 4, at 809-814.
32 An added wrinkle, particularly in the United States, is the vertical division of power between Federal and
state institutions. In order to address the topic at a level of generality useful to other jurisdictions, I do not discuss
that issue in this article.
33 Theoretically, one might argue that arbitration institutions such as the ICC or the AAA should make this
determination. I do not give this possibility separate treatment. Though some institutions such as the ICC or the
ICSID administrative body review the merits of the award, I am unaware of a major arbitration institution in
which the institution itself decides whether to authorize such review by the national courts. See YvEs DERAINS &
ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 291-292 (1998) (ICC review); MOSHE
HIRSCH,

THE ARBITRATION

MECHANISM

OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL

CENTER

FOR

THE

SETTLEMENT OF

INVESTMENT DISPUTES 33-38 and n. 99 (1993). Moreover, in order for an arbitration institution to become

involved at all, the parties ordinarily (with the exception of certain investment-related disputes) must invoke it in
their arbitration agreement. Accordingly, delegating this decision to an arbitration institution would simply be an
indirect form of party-based authorization. The dynamics might be distinctly different, but the practical
remoteness of this possibility counsels against its separate and extended treatment in this article.
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A.

LEGITIMACY

The institution's legitimacy is a key criterion in evaluating its competence to
authorize judicial review of arbitral awards for legal error. Legitimacy may be
understood as the source of legal authority for the institution's action. Such questions
appear frequently in the law. For example, judges often debate whether existing
statutory language can be interpreted to support a particular legal result or whether a
statute must first be amended to permit that result; this debate reflects competing views
about whether a legislature or a court is the proper institution to make that decision.
Legitimacy may take a variety of forms such as statutory authorization or authoritative
judicial interpretation in common law jurisdictions. High legitimacy promotes
confidence and stability in the legal regime. Low legitimacy sows doubt over the
institution's action and subjects the legal regime to instability.
1.

Courts

Court-based expansions of judicial review of arbitration awards suffer from a
legitimacy problem. Apologists for the "manifest disregard of the law" standard have
sought to anchor it either in the text of the FAA itself or in Supreme Court precedent.
Contrary to their arguments, neither statute nor precedent supports a judicially created
"manifest disregard of the law" standard.
Some courts and commentators have tried to fit the doctrine within one of the
existing grounds under the FAA. 3 4 Certainly, a statutory hook for the "manifest
disregard of the law" exception would strengthen substantially the doctrine's
legitimacy. This view, moreover, draws some support from Justice Stevens' dissent in
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth where he cited the FAA itself for the
35
proposition that awards are reviewable for manifest disregard of the law.
Despite these efforts, attempts to shoehorn the "manifest disregard of the law"
doctrine within the text of section 10(a) of the FAA are unpersuasive. Section 10(a) of
the FAA lists four subsections, quoted above, containing the grounds upon which a
court may vacate an arbitral award. 36 The "manifest disregard of the law" doctrine
clearly does not fit within the first two subsections of section 10(a), for the arbitrator's
adherence to legal norms does not involve how the award was procured (corruption,
fraud, undue means), nor the disposition of the arbitrators (partiality or corruption).
A slightly stronger argument can be made that it fits within section 10(a)(3), as an
arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law might constitute "misbehaviour by which the
rights of any party have been prejudiced." This argument, however, ultimately fails to
persuade. The first part of section 10(a)(3) provides that an award may be vacated
34 See, e.g., George Watts & Sons, Inc. v. Tiffany and Co., No. 00-3231, (CA7 Apr. 16, 2001); seegenerally
Mungioli, supra note 22, at 1099-1102 (collecting cases).
s 473 U.S. 614, 656 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36 See text accompanying note 9.
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where the arbitrators were "guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing
... or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy." This
language suggests that the term "misbehaviour" in section 10(a)(3) alludes to
procedural errors in the conduct of the arbitration hearing, not substantive errors in the
award itself.
By far the strongest and most prevalent textual argument is that an award rendered
in manifest disregard of the law exemplifies a situation under section 10(a)(4). Section
10(a)(4) provides for vacatur where the arbitrators "exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made." 37 Though defenders of the "manifest disregard of the
law" doctrine are often content to cite section 10(a)(4) generally, the statutory
language actually supports two different arguments. One might argue that the
arbitrator who commits manifest disregard of the law "exceeds" his powers.
Alternatively, one might argue that an arbitrator who manifestly disregards the law
"imperfectly executes" his powers. On the face of the statute, either ground would.
suffice to justify the vacatur of the award.
An arbitrator who manifestly disregards the law does not "exceed" his powers.
This variation of the argument cannot account for why the vacatur grounds should be
limited to "manifest" disregard of the law rather than any legal error whatsoever. If the
arbitration agreement empowers the arbitrators to render an award in accordance with
the chosen legal regime, then the arbitrators exceed their powers as soon as they
commit any error of law (or an erroneous application of law to fact) regardless of
whether the error is egregious or the question is a "close one." Such an interpretation,
however, contravenes the purposes of the FAA and clear Supreme Court precedent,
holding that the FAA was designed to reverse judicial hostility toward arbitration. 38 It
would render arbitration largely meaningless, for it would effectively expose any award
to plenary judicial review. Any error, regardless of how "manifest" or not, would be an
instance of the arbitrator "exceeding" his powers.
Though the question is closer, an arbitrator who manifestly disregards the law
does not "so imperfectly execute" his powers under the second half of section
10(a)(4). In contrast to the "exceed" language, the "so imperfectly executed"
language of section 10(a)(4) is a stronger candidate; the language "so imperfectly"
connotes an idea of degree and, thus, could account for why manifest disregard of
the law, but not normal errors, should constitute grounds for setting an award aside.
This argument ultimately founders because it cannot account for the final section of
the statute ("that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter
37 See, e.g.,United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 E3d 376, 379-82 (CA3 1995);
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc., 894 F.2d 862, 866 (CA6 1990); see generally Andrew M.
Campbell, Annotation, Construction and Application of 510(a)(4) of Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4))
Providing for Vacating of Arbitration Awards where Arbitrators Exceed or Imperfectly Execute Powers, 136
A.L.R. Fed. 183 §24 (1999) (collecting cases).
m See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1307 (2001); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.,
Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-271 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
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submitted was not made"). An award rendered in manifest disregard of the law,
despite the commission of error, still remains mutual, final and definite. It is directed
at both parties to the arbitration ("mutual"), resolves the dispute ("final") and does
so conclusively ("definite"). Read in context, the "so imperfectly executed"
language would appear to be directed at the familiar situation where the arbitrator
has failed to respond fully to the parties' submissions. 39 Thus, the "manifest disregard
of the law" exception cannot fit within the existing statutory grounds under section
10 of the FAA.
Instead of relying on the FAA itself, most courts and commentators have
grounded a judicially created "manifest disregard of the law" exception in existing
Supreme Court precedent. Principally, they rely on the Supreme Court's decisions in
Wilko v. Swann 40 and First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.41 Wilko involved the
arbitrability of claims under the Securities Act of 193342 brought by a purchaser of
securities against partners in a securities firm. The Supreme Court held that an
agreement to arbitrate future claims arising under that Act was invalid. 43 In its
discussion, the court stated that in cases such as the one before it "interpretations of law
by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts,
to judicial review for error in interpretation."' 44 Many courts embracing the "manifest
disregard of the law" exception have read this passage to constitute an implicit
endorsement of that exception. 45 In First Options, a unanimous court held, in relevant
part, that a court must conduct a de novo review of an arbitrator's ruling on
arbitrability unless the parties have agreed to submit that question to the arbitrator. 46 In
that discussion, the court noted that a reviewing court will set aside an arbitrator's
award "only in very unusual circumstances" and cited Wilko for the proposition that
"parties (are) bound by (an) arbitrator's decision not in 'manifest disregard of the
law' ,,).47 Since the decision in First Options, courts and commentators have read it to
reaffirm the principle extracted from Wilko that an arbitral award may be set aside for
48
manifest disregard of the law.
Contrary to these conclusions, there is absolutely no doctrinal basis for a judicially
created "manifest disregard of the law" rule. Wilko does not support this view. The
language from Wilko upon which courts rely is quintessential dictum. Wilko held that
3 See, e.g.,
Swiss l.P.G., art. 190.2(c).
4 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
41 514 U.S. 938 (1995). In the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence on arbitration law, in two dissenting
opinions, Justices have expressed support for the "manifest disregard of the law" exception. See Shearson/
American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 US. 220, 259 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Mitsubishi Motors, 473
U.S at 657 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 15 U.S.C. §77 (1933).
43 346 U.S. at 438.
44 Id. at 436-437.
's E.g., Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 E2d 6, 9 n.5 (CA1 1990); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,
847 E2d 631, 634 (CA10 1988).
46 514 U.S. at 943.

Ild. at 942.
4 E.g., Williams, 197 F3d at 759; see ,generally IV FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §40.7.1 (Ian R. MacNeil et al,
Supp. 1999).
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pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate customer-broker claims under the Securities Act of
1933 were unenforceable. Whether courts may review arbitral awards for manifest
disregard of the law is neither logically necessary for that holding nor essential to the
court's reasoning. Moreover, the doctrinal foundations of Wilko's "manifest disregard
of the law'" dictum are themselves highly suspect. 49 Finally, the Supreme Court
explicitly overruled Wilko. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the
Securities Act of 1933 were enforceable and explicitly overruled Wilko's contrary
holding.50 Thus, due to its vague dictum, questionable foundations and overruled
holding, Wilko does not support a judicially created "manifest disregard of the law"
doctrine.
First Options also does not support a judicially created manifest disregard of the law
doctrine. 5' The question presented in First Options did not concern the manifest
disregard of the law doctrine but concerned questions of arbitrability and the proper
standard of review. Like the language from Wilko, the reference in First Options is
52
neither logically anterior to the holding nor essential to the reasoning of the case.
Moreover, the claim in First Options that Rodriguez du Quijas had overruled Wilko "on
other grounds" (and presumably thereby left undisturbed Wilko's dicta concerning
manifest disregard of the law) ignores at least two strands of reasoning in Rodriguez de
Quyas that undermine Wilko's dictum at least as much as Wilko's holding.5 3 Rodriguez
de Quijas explained that it was necessary to overrule Wilko's holding in order to correct
an unjustified judicial hostility to arbitration.5 4 A broad-based judicially created rule
permitting judicial review of arbitral awards for legal error, such as the "manifest
disregard of the law" doctrine, represents a form of hostility toward arbitration much
like a judicially created non-arbitrability doctrine, carving out certain categories of
49 For example, one of the Supreme Court decisions cited by the court in Wilko explicitly undercut the
court's argument. In Burchell v. Marsh, the court explicitly stated that "[Ihf the award is within the submission and
contains the honest decision of the arbitrators, after a fill and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity will not
set it aside for error, either in law or fact.' 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1855). See Born, supra note 4, at 798 n. 49.
o 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
51 Prior to First Options, some courts of appeals had expressed a resistance to the manifest disregard of the law
standard, see, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (CA7 1994); Brown v. Rauscher
Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 E2d 775, 779 n.3 (CAI1 1993); McIlroy'v. Painewebber Inc., 989 E2d 817, 820 n.2
(CA5 1993) (per curiam); Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 E2d 539, 550 (CA8 1991).
52 By citing Wilko, the court was not necessarily endorsing the legal proposition contained therein. Rather,
it may have done so to signal its awareness of a view among the lower courts that it wished to. leave unresolved.
This makes sense. The court cannot address every single issue in a legal opinion. Thus, it errs on the side of
caution by leaving the issue for another day. Unfortunately, despite this cautionary language, the court regularly
must correct lower courts' misreading of this language, even if repeated in multiple opinions, precisely on the
ground that the language relied upon contains no holding on the proposition for which lower courts were citing
it. See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. 18, 24 (1994); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,
312 n.1 1 (1967). Thus, it is far wiser to read decisions such as First Options for what they hold and not for what a
particular isolated piece of language unessential to the court's holding might say.
53 In the wake of the decision in Rodriguez de Quijas, particularly before First Options, it is surprising that
lower courts did not undertake a more thoroughgoing re-examination of the doctrine permitting review of
arbitral awards for manifest disregard of the law. For a few cases that recognized this problem, see, e.g., Baravati, 28
E3d at 706; Rostad & Rostad Corp. v. Investment Management & Research, Inc., 923 E2d 694, 697 (CA9 1991);
see generally Born, supra note 4, at 810-811.
s4 490 U.S. at 480.
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rights from arbitration.55 Rodriguez de Quijas also identified a congressional policy
favoring arbitration, embodied in the FAA.5 6 Limited grounds for judicial review of
arbitral awards are part and parcel of that congressional policy; judicial expansion of
those grounds undermines that policy by encouraging parties to relitigate the merits
of their dispute before the courts. Thus, First Options merely layered more dictum onto
Wilko's already embattled dictum and, to the extent that it sought to reaffirm the
manifest disregard of the law principle, cannot be squared with the more relevant and
essential reasoning of Rodriguez de Qujas.57 The over-reading of Wilko, the misreading
of First Options and the cramped reading of Rodriguez de Quijas have combined to
create a bizarre regime in which the dictum of an outdated decision explicitly
overruled by the Supreme Court has received greater respect from the lower courts
than the essential reasoning of more relevant decisions.
One might argue that Congress implicitly endorsed the judicially created concept
of "manifest disregard of the law" review by failing to amend the statute after Wilko
and its progeny. The court has regularly relied on this "acceptance by silence"
argument to reaffirm various prior holdings.58 In this context, however, that concept is
unconvincing. The Supreme Court has never actually held that courts may review an
arbitral award for manifest disregard of the law. Thus, whatever the merits of assuming
congressional "acceptance by silence" of a judicial holding, it would be folly to expect
Congress to busy itself with the dicta of Supreme Court decisions as well. Moreover,
even if it could be assumed that Congress had embraced the concept expressed in
Wilko, the court expressly overruled that decision, and the reasoning of Rodriguez de
Quyas undermines the entire concept ofjudicially created review for manifest disregard
of the law. The logic of the "acceptance by silence" theory of Congressional inaction
cannot extend to dictum of a decision that the Supreme Court has explicitly overruled.
Finally, the "manifest disregard of the law" doctrine has developed only in lower court
decisions, and it would be unreasonable to read too much from Congress' inaction in
response to such decisions which, unlike Supreme Court decisions, do not have
uniform national application.
The judicially created doctrine of "manifest disregard of the law" does not find
support either in the FAA or in Supreme Court precedent. The doctrine cannot be
shoehorned into any of the existing grounds under the FAA. As a matter of judicial
precedent, the Supreme Court has never explicitly embraced a judicially created
ground for reviewing arbitral awards for legal errors. Arguments grounded on
legislative acceptance by silence are equally unpersuasive. Accordingly, the judicially
created review of arbitral awards for legal errors ranks low on the legitimacy scale.
55 See Baravati, 28 E3d at 706.
56 490 U.S. at 483.

s" First Options also casts doubt on the view, exemplified by justice Stevens' dissent in Mitsubishi, that the
"manifest disregard of the hw" doctrine can fit into one of the existing vacatur grounds under the FAA. See text
accompanying note 35.
58 See, e.g., Keene Corp v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 212 (1993); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580
(1978).
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2.

Parties

Party-based expansions also suffer from a legitimacy problem. Contrary to the
arguments of some courts and commentators, such arrangements do not derive support
from the FAA, nor from Supreme Court precedent.
As with the judicially created "manifest disregard of the law" doctrine, some
defenders of party-based expansions of the vacatur grounds have attempted to fit them
within the existing terms of the FAA. Under one theory, section 10 of the FAA
consists of a set of default rules which are subject to alteration by the parties;
expansions of the grounds for judicial review are exercises of the parties' right to
supplement those default rules.5 9 Under another theory, the text, history and structure
of the FAA all support the principle of party autonomy; party-based expansions of
60
judicial review track that principle and, thus, are consistent with the FAA.
Party-created standards of review, however, cannot be squared with the text or
structure of the FAA. 61 Several textual clues suggest that these grounds were meant to
have been binding and exclusive. Section 9 of the FAA provides that, upon a party's
application for an order to confirm an award, a court "must grant such an order unless
the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of [the
FAA]."162 The use of the imperative term "must" connotes a legislative preference for
upholding the award. The use of this mandatory term contrasts sharply with the use of
voluntary language in both sections 10 and 11. Both sections 10 and 11 provide that a
court "may" vacate or, respectively, modify an award for any of the grounds specified
therein. 63 The use of the volitional term "may" accords courts a modicum of discretion
to decline to vacate or modify an award despite the presence of one of the statutorily
specified grounds. Thus, the mandatory language of section 9 ("must") read alongside
the optional language of sections 10 and 11 ("may") collectively create a strong
presumption in favor of upholding arbitral awards. Party-based expansions of the
grounds for vacatur undercut that scheme.
Moreover, the explicit reference to section 10 in section 9 suggests that the
grounds contained in those sections, rather than those plus any others that parties
might design, provide the exclusive grounds for vacatur. Had Congress intended to
provide some space for parties to craft their own grounds for vacatur, it could easily
have drafted a statute providing that a court "must grant such an order unless the award
is vacated, modified or corrected." This would have de-coupled the issue of vacatur
from section 10 and left more flexibility, as a textual matter, for the parties' creativity.
Congress' failure to draft a statute along these lines, and instead to link vacatur with
Rau, supra note 27, at 231-233; Fils et Cables, 584 E Supp. at 244.
6oBrunet, supra note 25, at 77-84.
61 To the extent relevant to the question of statutory interpretation, the legislative history surrounding the
FAA's enactment suggests that the drafters either intended to exclude substantive review altogether or did not
consider the issue. See Turner, supra note 23, at 537-540 and n. 115-117 (discussing legislative history of the
FAA).
9 U.S.C.
S9.
s

Id. SS 10-11.
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section 10, provides a strong textual clue that Congress intended the grounds in section
64
10 to be exclusive.
Other textual evidence in the FAA strongly supports this interpretation.
Elsewhere in the FAA, Congress has demonstrated its ability explicitly to authorize
party-generated variations when it so chooses. Both with respect to the selection of
arbitrators and the proper venue for confirmation actions, Congress has provided for
default rules that the parties may override. 65 The venue provisions of section 9, the
same section regulating the manner of vacatur, provide an especially probative
example. In relevant part, section 9 of the FAA provides that the parties may specify
the court responsible for confirming an arbitral award. In cases where the parties'
agreement does not specify a court, section 9 provides that the venue shall be proper in
the court in the district where the award was made. Had Congress intended for the
vacatur grounds in section 10 to be similarly manipulable default rules, it could have
drafted section 9's vacatur provisions along the same lines as it did section 9's venue
provisions. Its failure to provide for party manipulation of the vacatur grounds, in
precisely the same section of the statute where it provided for such manipulation in
matters of venue, supplies strong evidence for the theory that the FAA does not permit
party-initiated expansion of the grounds for vacatur.
If the statute does not support party-based expansions, what about the Supreme
Court? As with the question whether courts may develop extra-statutory grounds for
vacatur of arbitral awards, the Supreme Court has also not addressed whether parties
may do so through the arbitration agreement. Appellate courts endorsing this practice
have drawn support from the Supreme Court's decision in Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland
StanfordJr. University.66 Volt held that where the parties specified a state choice-of-law
clause in the arbitration agreement, the FAA did not pre-empt the provisions of the
(California) state arbitration law governing when an arbitration would be stayed. 67 In
reaching this conclusion, the court observed that:
Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally
free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by
contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify by contract the rules
68
under which that arbitration will be conducted.
64 One might also argue that the phrase "pursuant to" in S 9 should be read in procedural terms rather than
substantive ones. In other words, the statute should be interpreted to mean: "a court must grant an order to confirm
an arbitral award unless it undertakes the act of vacating the award as contemplated in Section 10." This counterargument is slightly stronger than the previous one and is buttressed by the parallel reference to S 11's modification
order, suggesting that the "pursuant to" language isreferring to types oforders rather than the exclusive grounds upon
which those orders may be granted. Neither S 10 nor S 11 contains many clues indicating which interpretation is the
better one, but this "procedural" interpretation of§ 9's language is also problematic. If the "pursuant to" language is
meant in procedural terms, then the reference to S 10 is essentially superfluous. Section 10 does not really elaborate
in any terms on how a court is to vacate an award; rather, it simply provides that an award may be vacated and then
lists the grounds thereto (S 11 is similarly structured). Thus, it would be rather odd to refer to another statutory section
for the procedure for vacating an award when that section contains no elaboration or specification on that point.
65 See 9 U.S.C. S 5 (appointment); id. S 9 (venue).
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
67 Id. at 476-479.
6 Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
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Several appellate courts have relied on this language to support the proposition
that parties may expand the grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards in their
69
arbitration agreements.
As a matter of precedent, post- Volt developments suggest that the opinion cannot
support party-based expansions of the grounds for judicial review. In the aftermath of
Volt, scholars widely criticized the decision for wreaking havoc on the doctrine
concerning the FAA's pre-emption of state arbitration laws. 70 In a string of post- Volt
decisions, the Supreme Court narrowed the reach of that case. 71 Most significantly, the
court held that the FAA pre-empted both a state law forbidding prospective arbitration
agreements and a state law regulating the placement and typeface of arbitration
clauses. 72 Read together, Volt and its progeny stand for the proposition that the parties
may adopt rules supporting the arbitral process but not undermining it.73 This principle
might support party-generated contractions of the grounds for the vacatur of arbitral
awards, but it hardly supports party-based expansions. Party-based expansions
undermine the arbitral process. They increase the likelihood that an arbitral award will
be set aside and invite more intrusive judicial intervention into the arbitral process.
Accordingly, the logic of Volt, read in light of its progeny, does not support partybased expansions of the grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards.
Even if Volt's statement that "parties are generally free to structure their arbitration
agreements as they see fit" survived the decision's burial, it does not authorize parties
to expand the FAA's vacatur grounds. In holding that the FAA did not pre-empt
Californian law referenced in the parties' agreement, the court was merely determining
the applicable legal scheme. This is suggested by the very next sentence in the court's
opinion: "Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitration,
enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with
the goals of the FAA. ... ,,74 Thus, when read in context, the language cited from Volt
stands merely for the proposition that the FAA permits parties to opt for a particular
arbitration law which results in an outcome other than that which would have been
obtained under the FAA.7 5 The choice between different arbitration laws or rules
merely involves the parties' peculiar interests.
69 Lapine, 130 F3d at 888; Syncor, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248 at *16-17; Gateway Tech., 64 E3d at
996-997.
70 See Born, supra note 4, at 340-341, 358-380.
7'1See Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Allied Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
72Allied Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265 (FAA pre-empts Alabama statute prohibiting prospective arbitration
agreements); Doctors Associates, 517 U.S. 681 (FAA pre-empts Montana statute requiring arbitration clauses to
appear in capital letters on first page of document).
73 This is not the only possible reading of Volt consistent with subsequent Supreme Court case law. Volt might
also stand for the proposition that parties may incorporate certain rules by reference to state law (e.g. Californian
law in Volt, New York law in Mastrobuono). This alternative reading does not affect my thesis here. For the
incorporated rule still would have to be enforceable in a system employing legitimacy as one of its criteria. On the
other hand, in purely contractual models concerned solely with the parties' economic interests, the different
interpretation of Volt might be significant. I am grateful to Professor Chris Drahozal and Jeffrey Greenblatt for
their helpful observations on this point.
74489 U.S. at 479.
75 For a similar argument on this point, see Cole, supra note 25, at1247-1248.
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In contrast to the parties' choice of a legal scheme, their alteration of an existing
one involves very different interests. Alterations of those laws or rules (as in the case of
party-based expansions for vacatur beyond those expressly provided in the FAA) can
upset the institutional interests of the body crafting those rules. A legislature may have
valid reasons why it wishes to restrict the ground upon which arbitral awards may be
76
vacated. For one thing, restricted grounds for review can conserve judicial resources.
Several of the grounds for vacatur of an award under section 10 of the FAA such as
whether the award was procured by fraud or whether the arbitrator erroneously
refused to hear evidence easily can be applied without substantial factual development
or record review. Requiring a court to decide whether substantial evidence supports
the arbitrator's factual findings or whether the arbitrator has committed legal error may
require a much more time-consuming and exhaustive review of the arbitration.
Apart from the resource costs, a legislature may not want its courts to develop
precedent on questions of law or applications of fact to law in cases arising out of
arbitrations. Factual development, discovery rules and other procedural aspects may
affect the record and the arguments presented to the tribunal and, subsequently, to the
court. These findings may influence how the court resolves the case on review.
Moreover, the court's review will depend on the grounds upon which an arbitrator
resolves the case. Arbitrators can sometimes resolve a case on one of several grounds
(e.g., the statute of limitations has run, the defendant is not liable as a matter of law, the
defendant could be liable but not under these circumstances, etc.). Conversely, the
arbitrator may overlook a particular basis for resolving a case that would obviate
the need to deal with a certain legal question. The arbitrator's choice of grounds for
resolving a dispute (or failure to choose grounds) will influence the legal questions that
a court must address in order to conduct a substantive review of the award. In light of
this risk of uncertain or unnecessary judicial pronouncements on questions of law, a
legislature may understandably opt, instead, for a regime under which courts do not
delve into the merits of the arbitrator's award. Unbridled enforcement of party-based
expansions of vacatur grounds ignores these institutional interests and co-opts the
judicial system, forcing courts to develop precedent on certain legal issues despite the
absence of procedural safeguards attendant to an ordinary trial.
Some courts have suggested a separate reason why Congress might oppose partybased expansions of the grounds for judicial review. They argue that such arrangements
constitute efforts to expand the "jurisdiction" of the federal courts, and that this
prerogative belongs exclusively to Congress. 77 This argument is mistaken, at least in
cases under chapter 1 of the FAA. The Supreme Court has specified that chapter 1 of
the FAA does not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.7 8 Instead,
76See Smit, supra note

27, at 150.
77 E.g., UHC, 148 E3d at 997-998; Lapine, 130 E3d at 891 (MyerJ., dissenting); Chicago Typographical Union,
935 E3d at 1505 (dicta).
78 See Moses H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983); Fils et Cables, 584 F
Supp. at 244.
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applications for orders under the FAA must have an independent jurisdictional basis
such as diversity or alienage. Thus, expansion of the grounds for judicial review does
not usurp Congress' prerogative to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts, at
least in cases governed by section 10. 79 This jurisdictional objection may carry more
weight in the case of awards falling under the conventions. Chapters 2 and 3 provide
an independent basis for jurisdiction for cases falling under the New York and Panama
Conventions.80 Where one of those chapters provides the basis for jurisdiction of a
review action, party-based expansions of the grounds for review could constitute
attempts to expand the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, contrary to
prevailing principles of federal jurisdiction. Though this principle has not been tested at
the federal level, several state courts have employed that theory to invalidate parties'
8
efforts to expand the grounds for judicial review. '
Thus, party-based expansions of the grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards
generally rank low on the scale of legitimacy. Neither the FAA nor Supreme Court
precedent adequately supports these innovations. Party-based expansions trample on
legislative prerogatives concerning the allocation of judicial resources and the manner
in which precedent evolves.
3.

Legislatures

Legislatively authorized judicial review of arbitral awards for legal error does not
suffer from a legitimacy problem and warrants only brief comment. Little controversy
exists over the power of the legislature to regulate the grounds upon which an arbitral
award may be vacated. International norms, under which virtually all nations regulate
the vacatur of arbitral awards in legislative enactments, support this view. 2 Within the
United States, the predominant source of law on vacatur grounds is statutory, as
exemplified by section 10 of the FAA. Accordingly, in the case of federal law, if
Congress were to expand the FAA to permit judicial review of awards for legal error,
as some state and other nations' legislatures provided in their own laws, there would be
little doubt over the legitimacy of such a course.
Certain legislative regimes can reduce the legitimacy deficit associated with the
party-developed expansions of the grounds forjudicial review. Under such a regime, the
legislature initially creates a separate system providing for judicial review of the arbitral
award for factual or legal error; the parties then choose whether to opt into this alternative
system. NewJersey has incorporated such an option into its arbitration laws.8 3 In contrast
to pure party-based regimes, these types of opt-in regimes preserve the legislative
prerogative to decide whether, as an initial matter, its courts should busy themselves with
See Rau, supra note 27, at 227-230.
9 U.S.C. SS 203, 302.
81 See, e.g., Konicki, 441 N.E.2d 1333.
See, e.g., Swiss I.P.R.G., art. 190; Austrian Z.P.O. S 595.
83 NJ. Stat. Rev. 2A:23A-13 (1999).
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the questions of law underpinning an arbitral award or should develop precedent on
important questions of substantive law through their review of arbitral awards.
B.

ERROR COSTS

Error costs represent a second important criterion in evaluating the proper
institution to promulgate a rule. Error costs are *afunction of two variables: the rate of
error and the consequences of the error. Important in this regard is the ease with which
errors can be corrected; if the institution can correct errors easily or at little cost, total
error costs will be lower. Under this criterion, the optimal institution would be that
institution whose rule yields the lowest error costs.
In the specific context of judicial review of arbitral awards, one methodological
point should be made here. The term "error" might have at least two definitions. On
the one hand, "error" might be a situation in which a court misapplies an institution's
rule (e.g., where a court finds manifest disregard of the law to exist where none exists
or vice versa). On the other hand, "error" might be a situation in which a court
correctly applies an institution's rule but reaches the wrong legal result (e.g., where a
court concludes that the arbitrators did not render an award in manifest disregard of the
law even though the award is legally erroneous). In my view, "error" is properly
understood in the former sense.- i.e., misapplication of the rule. If it were to be used
in the latter sense, that would ignore the institutional interests that might counsel in
favor of more limited judicial review of an arbitral error and largely eviscerate the value
of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. Thus, in the section infra, I use the
term "error" to describe situations where the courts misapply an institution's standard
rather than situations where the courts reach the wrong result on the law.
1.

Courts

Judicially created standards yield potentially high error costs. The rate of error
may be high due to several difficulties in its application: non-workability in cases
where arbitrators have not given reasons for their award, inconsistency between
articulation and application in a particular case, inconsistent application across cases,
and unclear elaboration of a general standard.
A judicially generated standard for reviewing arbitral awards for legal error risks
high error costs due to difficulties in applying it when the arbitrators have failed to give
reasons for their award. Unless required by the parties' agreement or the applicable
institutional rules, arbitrators in the United States are not required to give reasons for
their decision.8 4 This norm complicates application of the "manifest disregard of the

84 E.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960); PrudentialBache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 E3d 234, 240 n.9 (CA1 1995); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F2d 1211,
1214-1215 (CA2 1972); see generally Born, supra note 4, at 794.
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law" standard.85 As described above, the standard generally requires proof that the
arbitrators consciously disregarded the applicable legal principle.8 6 Evidence of this
conscious disregard, however, will be hard to come by in situations where arbitrators
have not given reasons for their decisions.8 7 This dilemma forces courts to react in one
of two ways. They must comb the entire record to ascertain whether there is any
rational basis for the award.88 Alternatively, they must conclude that no manifest
disregard of the law occurred due to the absence of record evidence.8 9 In either case,
the absence of record evidence complicates the courts' review and enhances the risk
that the reviewing court will reach an erroneous decision. 90
Application of the judicially created "manifest disregard of the law" standard can
also be internally inconsistent. The Second Circuit's decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Bobker ("Bobker") exemplifies this sort of problem. 91 That case
arose from a district court order setting aside an award in a securities-related dispute on
the grounds that the arbitrators had manifestly disregarded the law. It involved whether
an investor was entitled to recover damages from a stockbroker, who had refused to
carry out a short-sale on the grounds that it would have violated a Rule of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (Rule 10b-4). 92 In Bobker, the Second Circuit
reversed the district court's judgment and held that the arbitrators had not manifestly
disregarded the law. 93 The Second Circuit began its opinion by articulating the most
widely used general principles of review for manifest disregard of the law: (a) that a
patently obvious legal principle governed the case and (b) that the arbitrators
consciously disregarded that principle. 94 After reciting these principles, the court
delved into the merits and engaged in an extensive analysis of the tribunal's and the
85 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F3d 418, 421 (CA6 1995) ("Where, as
here, the arbitrators decline to explain their resolution of certain questions of law, a party seeking to have the
award set aside faces a tremendous obstacle."); O.K. Sec. v. Professional Planning Assoc, 857 F.2d 742, 747 (CAll
1988) ("Where the arbitrators do not give their reasons, it is nearly impossible for the courts to determine whether
they acted in disregard of the law."); see also In re I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424,
429 (CA2 1974) ("It seems rather anomalous, but had the arbitral majority failed to render a written opinion in
this case, our ability - ignoring the question of our power - to review that decision would be gready limited.").
For a thoughtful discursus on the problem, see Willemin, 103 E3d at 12-13.
8 See text accompanying note 21.
87 See Dawahare v. Spencer, 210 E3d 666, 670 (CA6 2000); FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc., 894 F2d at 871
(Martin, ChiefJudge concurring)
88 E.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc., 128 E3d 1456, 1461 (CAll 1997) (concluding that the
tribunal manifestly disregarded the law because "[in the absence of any stated reasons for the decision and in light
of the marginal evidence presented to it, we cannot say that this is not what the panel did:'); Robbins v. Day, 954
E2d 679, 684 (CAll 1992).
" E.g., Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 E2d 1410, 1413 (CAl11990) ("Since
nothing on the face of the record indicates that the arbitrators were aware of some legal standard which they
ignored in fashioning the award, we certainly cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in confirming
the award"); Pyle v. Securities U.S.A., Inc., 758 F. Supp. 638 (D. Colo. 1991).
9o Admittedly, the analysis on this point depends also on the substantive standard. One could imagine a
regime whereunder courts would presume manifest disregard of the law where arbitrators have failed to give
reasons for their award. Whatever the other consequences of such a rule, it at least would reduce these error costs
by providing a clear standard and encouraging arbitrators to give reasons for their awards.
91 808 F.2d 930 (CA 2 1986).
9 See 17 CFR S 240.10b-4.
93 808 E2d 930 at 937.
94 See text accompanying note 21.
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district court's applications of Rule 10b-4. It then went so far as to intimate that the
SEC's Rule governing the case might be invalid. 95
This analysis ignored the very framework that the court had just articulated. The
court simply should have asked either whether the tribunal's application of Rule 10b-4
was an obvious error or, alternatively, whether the arbitrators consciously disregarded
that error. Had it conducted such an analysis (the one that it claimed to be
conducting), the opinion would have read quite differently and been far narrower. 96 It
was clear from the record in the case that the arbitrators had extensively considered the
applicability of Rule 1Ob-4: they had dedicated an entire hearing and set of briefings to
the matter. Moreover, it was highly doubtful whether there was a clearly applicable
legal principle governing the case. The district court saw the necessity to order
supplemental briefing on the subject from the SEC, and the arbitrators themselves
admitted that the case was a close one, describing the state of the law as
"indeterminate." Thus Bobker illustrates how, under the judicially created "manifest
disregard of the law" standard, the standard actually applied by the courts may be far
more rigorous than the standard that they purport to be applying.
Related to the problem of internal inconsistency between the articulation of a
standard and its application, is how the standard is applied across cases. Judicially
created standards run the risk that divergences will develop between various courts
attempting to apply those standards. A comparison of two decisions applying the
) 97
doctrine to similar types of cases, Halligan v. PiperJaffray
and Williams v. Cigna
98
FinancialAdvisors, Inc. demonstrates the point.
Halligan involved a securities dealer's claim of age discrimination against his
employer. Reversing a district court judgment confirming a panel's award in favor of
the employer, the Second Circuit held that the award reflected a manifest disregard of
the law. 99 The court began with a general articulation of the principles governing
review under the judicially created "manifest disregard of the law" standard. It then
launched into an extensive tirade against securities-industry arbitration, particularly in
the context of federal civil rights claims. Concluding that "strong evidence that
Halligan was fired because of his age" established the "clear principle" that the tribunal
should have used to decide the case, the court then implicitly concluded that the
arbitrators had consciously disregarded this principle. This conclusion was especially
odd in light of the fact that no evidence in the record actually established that the panel
had consciously disregarded the "clear principle" or even that the applicable legal
standard had been explained to the panel. Instead, the court appeared to infer their

s 808 F.2d 930 at 934-937.
Judge Meskill's concurring opinion provides a model for how an opinion actually applying the standards
that the majority had articulated might have looked. Id. at 937-938.
s 148 E3d 197 (CAll 1998).
98 197 E3d 752 (CA5 1999).
9 148 E3d at 204.
16
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conscious disregard from the fact that the tribunal declined to explain their award
though no applicable rule had required them do to so. 1°
In Williams v. Cigna Financial Advisors, Inc., the Fifth Circuit confronted the
identical issue. There, a district court confirmed a tribunal's award denying relief to a
securities dealer on his claims of age discrimination against his employer. Conducting a
highly deferential review, the court found that the evidence "solidly supported a
reasonable finding" that Williams had lost his active agent status not on the basis of his
age but on the basis of ineffective performance unrelated to his age. The court,
therefore, declined to set aside the award.
A comparison of the decisions in Halligan and Williams demonstrates how the
judicial "manifest disregard of the law" standard can yield inconsistent application
across cases. In both cases, the appellate courts were presented with conflicting
explanations from the ex-employee and the employer about the grounds for the
dismissal; moreover, in both cases, the district court had entered factual findings
supporting the tribunal's conclusion dismissing the age discrimination claim.
Nonetheless, on review, the Second Circuit in Halligan essentially overrode the district
court's (and the tribunal's) findings to conclude that the tribunal had manifestly
disregarded the law, while the Fifth Circuit in Williams engaged in a far more
deferential review, declining to disturb the district court's holding or to find that the
tribunal had committed error warranting vacatur. While the precise amount of
evidence of age discrimination reported in the two opinions differed, the different
analysis conducted by the two courts suggests that, at a minimum, the Fifth Circuit
might have reached a different result on the facts of Halligan.'0 1 Under the deferential
review conducted by the court in Williams, the Fifth Circuit might well have affirmed,
on the basis of the district court's finding in Halligan, that the record supported the
arbitrators' conclusions in that case. 10 2 Thus, a comparison between the decisions in
Halligan and Williams demonstrates that, even where circuit courts purport to be
applying the same general "manifest disregard of the law" standard, vast differences in
how they actually apply that standard breed inconsistency and uncertainty in the
103
doctrine.

100Halligan exemplifies a judicially manufactured doctrine, unconstrained by legislative standards, run amok.
The decision has been widely criticized for, among other reasons, the fact that the opinion dramatically expands
review under the "manifest disregard of the law" standard, for the fact that it implicitly imports a requirement that
an arbitral tribunal give reasons for its decision notwithstanding any such explicit requirement in the text or rules
and for the fact that it arguably expands the "manifest disregard of the law" doctrine to permit vacatur for
"manifest disregard of the evidence.' See, e.g., Rees, supra note 23, at 365-366.
101In the interest of completeness, it should be noted that the National Association of Securities Dealers has
modified its rules governing the mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims. See Williams, 197
E3d at 764.
102 See alsoJaros, 70 E3d at 421 ("Yet even a misapplication of well defined and explicit legal principles does
not constitute manifest disregard.'); Willemijn, 103 E3d at 14 ("We cannot say that the law as applied to the facts
of this case is so clear and obvious that there was an error that an average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator
should have instantaneously perceived and corrected.").
103 For a recent interesting discussion of the tensions in application of the "manifest disregard of the law"
standard which suggested this tension between Halligan and Williams, see Mungioli, supra note 23, at 1103-1106.
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A final flaw in a judicially developed rule such as the "manifest disregard of the
law" doctrine is that it can easily mutate into a more searching form of merits-based
review. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Cole v. Burns International Security Services
(Cole) 10 4 provides a good example. Like Halligan and Williams, Cole involved an
employee's claims under federal civil rights laws. While the appellate court affirmed a
district court order compelling arbitration of such claims, the interesting aspect of its
opinion is its discussion of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard. Recognizing
that the Supreme Court had never defined this standard, the court reasoned that "this
type of review must be defined by reference to the assumptions underlying the Court's
endorsement of arbitration."10 5 Elaborating on this fuzzy notion, the court in Cole
distinguished between statutory claims and non-statutory ones, reasoning that in the
former case the plaintiff must not be forced to forego the rights afforded by the statute
and the judicial review must be sufficient to ensure that the arbitrators comply with the
requirements of the statute at issue. Moreover, in cases where the arbitration presents a
novel or difficult question of law, the court emphasized that courts "are empowered to
review an arbitrator's award to ensure that its resolution of public law issues is
correct.'

' 106

While commendable for its effort to provide some elaboration on the "manifest
disregard of the law" standard, Cole illustrates how a judicially crafted rule can wreak
havoc on the doctrine. Other circuits have applied the same "manifest disregard of the
law" review to arbitral awards without providing the special Cole scrutiny to statutory
claims; thus developments, such as decisions in Cole, ensure further non-uniformity in
the case law. 10 7 Furthermore, Cole provides no basis for applying a special type of
"manifest disregard of the law" review to statutory claims. Both Wilko and First
Options, the only Supreme Court majority decisions to mention the concept, arose in
the context of statutory claims. Neither, however, suggested that the type of analysis
conducted by a reviewing court should turn on the type of claim being reviewed.
Finally, even if its questionable origins are put to one side, the distinction drawn by
Cole between statutory and non-statutory claims may easily prove untenable. Plaintiffi
often lump both statutory and non-statutory claims into a single case, and arbitrators,
not being required to provide reasons for their award, may render an award without
specifying whether it is based in the statutory or non-statutory claims made by the
plaintiff. 0 8 The upshot of a decision such as Cole is that it creates further uncertainty
among the circuits about the state of the "manifest disregard of the law" rule and
pushes the doctrine closer toward a de novo review of arbitral awards for legal errors.
Thus, a judicially designed standard of reviewing arbitral awards for legal errors
risks potentially high error costs. It encounters workability problems due to the lack of
1- 105 E3d 1465 (1997).
105 Id. at 1487.
106 Id.

107 E.g., Jaros, 70 F3d at 420.

'08 Id. at 422 (finding that state common law claims support arbitrators' lump-sum award even if arbitrators
manifestly disregarded the law on statutory claims).
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a general requirement that the tribunal give reasons for its award, risks internally
inconsistent application expanding the scope of review beyond its purported
boundaries, suffers from inconsistent inter-jurisdictional application and generates
inconsistent elaboration of the general standard. The case law method by which
judicial rules evolve might limit these costs. Subsequent courts might interpret prior
precedents more narrowly or otherwise generate a more refined and uniform standard
for review of arbitral awards for errors of law. At the same time, principles of stare
decisis restrict the lower courts' ability to adjust meaningfully the standard and, absent a
clear signal from the Supreme Court, lower courts seem reluctant to overthrow the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard. As a result, the inconsistencies that plague it
and the resulting error costs are likely to persist.
2.

Parties

Party-authorized review for legal errors also entails error costs. However, those
error costs are not as significant as with judicially crafted standards. Error rates can be
high due to judicial misinterpretation of the parties' standards. However, total error
costs should be lower, due to the more limited consequences of an erroneous
decision.
Error rates in the case of party-authorized review of arbitral awards for legal errors
can be high. Even where parties have explicitly inserted expanded grounds for judicial
review in their arbitration agreements, reviewing courts must still undertake the task of
interpreting those agreements in light of the language and the parties' intentions.
Those intentions may not always be clear, and the record ofjudicial treatment of such
party-based expansions demonstrates the pitfalls.
The decisions in Gateway and Syncor are illustrative. In Gateway, the relevant
language in the arbitration clause provided that "errors of law" should be subject to
appeal; in Syncor, the agreement provided that an award could be corrected for "errors
of law or legal reasoning." 10 9 Both courts took the rather bold step of interpreting this
language to authorize de novo review of legal conclusions. 110 But this move was far
from obvious. Both courts might have interpreted the language to import a variety of
different standards such as harmless error review (as the district court in Gateway had
done), a "manifest disregard of the law" standard (as the district court in Syncor had
done) or a standard such as whether reasonable minds could disagree over the subject.
As a result of their expansive interpretation, the courts adopted a course not evident
from the language in the agreements.
Even where there is no ambiguity about the meaning of the standard of expanded
review, Gateway and Syncor illustrate that the court's actual application of that standard
may depart sharply from the parties' intentions. In Gateway, the court held that the
109Gateway, 64 E3d at 995; Syncor, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248 at 15.
ItO Gatewy, 64 F3d at 997; Syncor, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248 at '17.
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appeal with respect to the prevailing party's attorneys' fees had been waived. 11' While
on the surface this argument might appear plausible, it is actually quite striking in the
context of the case, as the court had interpreted the agreement to provide for de novo
review of legal errors, and an erroneous award of attorneys' fees obviously qualified as
a type of legal error. Moreover, the agreement did not provide that the errors had to
be properly preserved; instead, the court effectively read a preservation requirement
into the agreement in order to reach its "waiver" conclusion. The court in Gateway
made a similar move in evaluating the punitive damages award in that case. The basis
for the punitive damages was not especially clear from the arbitrator's award. After
concluding that an award of punitive damages had to be grounded in a tort claim and
that Gateway had not waived its tort claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the court
vacated the award of punitive damages on the ground that "the facts do not sustain a
112
claim for breach of fiduciary duty," the existence of which was "a question of fact."
This review, however, departs radically from the standard under which the parties had
authorized appellate review, namely review for "errors of law." By the court's own
admission, however, the court was revisiting the factual findings or, at best, the
application of law to fact - neither of which it was explicitly authorized to review
under the parties' agreement. Though its analysis was far more conclusory and.less
probing, the court in Syncor took similar liberties with the standard after interpreting it
to permit de novo review of legal conclusions. After reviewing the record and the
award, the appellate court concluded that the arbitrator "did not commit error, either
legal or factual, in issuing his award."' 113 Though perhaps merely a case of sloppy
draftsmanship, the court's very suggestion that the arbitrator had not committed
"factual" error suggested that the court in Syncor, like the court in Gateway, had
exceeded the bounds of review contemplated by the parties.
In contrast to judicially developed standards, however, party-developed standards
can reduce the error rate by linking a requirement to give reasons with judicial review
for legal errors. As explained above, one of the difficulties of a judicially developed
standard of review of arbitral awards for legal error is that it is difficult to apply in
countries such as the United States, where arbitrators are usually not required to give
reasons for their decisions. Party-based expansions of the grounds for review can avoid
this collision of norms. Parties can easily require in the arbitration agreement that the
arbitrators give reasons for their decision. This requirement may be inserted either
directly, in the form of an explicit clause in the arbitration agreement, 114 or indirectly,
through adoption of a particular set of arbitral rules requiring the arbitrators to give
reasons for their decision." 5 A requirement that arbitrators give reasons for their
decision facilitates the process ofjudicial review; courts are more easily able to evaluate
m 64 E3d at 998.
lZ 64 E3d at 1000-1001.
113 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 21248 at *18.
114 E.g., Lapine, 130 F.3d at 886-887.
"Is E.g., UNCITRAL Rules, art. 32(3); ICC Rules, art. 25(2); LCIA Rules, art. 26(1); AAA Int'l Rules,
art. 27.2.
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whether the arbitrators committed a (manifest) legal error in arriving at the award. " 6
As a result, error rates decline.
Apart from potentially lower error rates, party-based expansions of the grounds
for judicial review also carry less powerful consequences in case of error. In the case of
party-based expansions, the significance of the expanded review is limited to the
particular case because its authorization is anchored in the arbitration agreement itself
By contrast, court-based expansions have a greater impact because they apply across all
cases within a given jurisdiction. This milder effect of party-based expansions may,
however, decline over time. As such clauses are employed more frequently and
evaluated by courts, certain model clauses may develop and be replicated in multiple
agreements, generating a stream of doctrine on their scope and application. Over time,
repeat use of these model clauses might even result in a fairly stable equilibrium. The
phenomenon of party-based expansions of vacatur grounds is too recent for this effect
to be evaluated, but the potential exists that a body of law will develop around certain
17
types of common clauses as it has around other types of model arbitration clauses.'
For now, at least, it would appear that party-based expansions have less drastic
consequences.
Thus, the error costs associated with party-based standards are relatively low but
not non-existent. Party-based standards still suffer from interpretive inconsistencies as
evidenced by the decisions in Gateway and Syncor. Parties, however, can reduce error
rates by explicitly linking expanded judicial review with a requirement that arbitrators
give reasons for their award. Moreover, the consequences of an erroneous
interpretation of party-based expansions are less drastic across all cases than the
consequences ofjudicial rules.
3.

Legislatures

The analysis of error costs of a legislative rule largely tracks that of a judicial one.
A legislative standard is subject to problems of internally inconsistent application, and
unclear elaboration. Moreover, so long as the governing arbitration law does not
require arbitrators to provide reasons for their decisions, it may be equally difficult for
courts applying a legislative standard to ascertain whether the arbitrators committed
legal error. In at least three respects, however, the dynamics of the analysis of a
legislative rule differ from those of a judicial one.
First, when interpreting a legislative rule, courts will rely on a different set of
sources that may influence how the court elaborates on the rule. In interpreting the
judicially created "manifest disregard of the law" standard, courts are forced to look to
11 Moreover, an arbitrator's failure to provide reasons for the award, despite such a requirement, can be
grounds for vacating the award. SeeWestern Employers Ins. Co. v. Jeffries & Co., 958 F.2d 258 (CA9 1992); see
also Fils
et Cables, 584 F Supp. at 246-247 (remanding for arbitrators' failure to provide factual findings despite
such a requirement in the arbitration agreement).
1'7

See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS 82-83 (1999)

(discussing clauses for expanding the vacatur grounds and noting the enforceability concerns).
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the rationale underlying the standard's development and evolution in the case law. In
contrast, when interpreting a legislative "manifest disregard of the law" standard, they
would appeal to different sources of authority such as the plain language of the statute,
the statutory structure or the legislative history (putting aside the question of the
legitimacy or order of priority of these sources)."' Depending on what those sources
reveal, it may be possible to arrive at a more definitive and firm conviction about the
meaning of legislative language. The analysis may yield different results, especially in
areas involving potentially conflicting legislative policies, such as those the Cole court
grappled with in trying to reconcile the "manifest disregard of the law" standard with a
potential legislative interest in proper resolution of statutory claims. Where appeal to
the statutory sources yields firmer conclusions, error costs decline.
Secondly, a legislative standard may increase error costs due to its relative
inflexibility and the difficulty of correcting errors. A legislative standard is less easily
corrected than a judicial or a party-based one. Enacting legislation is difficult and
expensive; it involves a substantial investment of time and resources. By contrast,
standards developed through other institutions will be relatively easier to adjust. A
judicial standard can be adjusted, at least partly, through case law. A party-based
standard can be adjusted even more easily through modifications of agreements. The
legislature, however, may be able to hedge against this risk through the use of "opt-in"
mechanisms in its Arbitration Act."19 Through such mechanisms, the parties can
regulate the error costs associated with the legislative standard by deciding whether
they wish to employ the review mechanism. Moreover, in contrast to pure party-based
expansions, opt-in mechanisms offer some of the advantages of uniformity and greater
predictability in interpretation, thereby avoiding some of the interpretive pitfalls
demonstrated by decisions such as Gateway and Syncor.
Thirdly, a legislature can reduce error costs in the application of its rule by tying it
to a requirement that arbitrators give reasons for their award. Many legislative regimes
providing for judicial review of arbitral awards for legal errors couple that requirement
with a requirement that arbitrators provide reasons for their award. 120 Through this
coupling of requirements, courts reviewing the award after it has been rendered are
better able to discern whether the tribunal committed a legal error in its decision. The
greater workability of this standard yields relatively lower error costs than a judicially
generated one which cannot automatically impose an ex ante requirement that
arbitrators give reasons for their decisions.

118Here, it should be noted that a differently phrased legislative standard could reduce error costs generated
by uncertainty. If the standard provided that the arbitrator's legal conclusions were to be reviewed de novo, then
there would be relatively less uncertainty over how to apply the standard. However, a residual uncertainty might
linger over whether to classifyr a particular premise of the arbitral award as a legal conclusion, a factual finding or
a mixed question of fact and law (an uncertainty suggested by the decisions in Gateway and Syncor applying partydeveloped standards of judicial review).
119SEe text accompanying notes 28-30.
120See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Cont. Code S 10240.8; New Jersey Stat. Rev. S 2A:23A-12 (1999).
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Thus, error costs associated with a legislative rule providing for expanded judicial
review of an arbitral award seem to fall somewhere between those for court-based and
party-based rules. Legislative rules risk many of the same errors of application that
plague judicial rules. Moreover, legislative rules, in contrast to judicial rules or partybased ones, are relatively more difficult to fix due to the costs of enacting legislation.
On the other hand, costs may be lower depending on the extent to which general
methods of statutory interpretation yield clearer results. By linking substantive review
of arbitral awards with a requirement to give reasons, a legislature can avoid some of
the difficulties that complicate application of a judicial rule.
C.

TRANSACTION COSTS

Transaction costs comprise another important factor in evaluating an institution's
competence as the source of a legal rule. Transaction costs may be understood as the
costs borne by the parties in effecting an exchange as a result of the legal rule. They
may come in a variety of forms, such as costs of negotiating a particular term of the
agreement. High transaction costs promote undesirable inefficiency in the commercial
system. Low transaction costs yield relatively greater efficiency.
1.

Courts

Judicially based rules involve relatively lower transaction costs in some respects
and higher ones in others. In the case of review of arbitral awards for legal errors, a
judicially crafted rule permitting review for legal errors reduces the parties' costs insofar
as they do not need to negotiate over its inclusion in the arbitration agreement. On the
other hand, it increases the transaction costs insofar as parties must investigate the
choice of forum more closely.
Judicially crafted rules for review of arbitral awards involve some lower
transaction costs. In this case, a judicial rule that awards will be reviewed for manifest
disregard of the law essentially provides an implied term to the parties' agreement. In
cases where one of the parties desires such review, the pre-existing judicial rule,
automatically applicable to the agreement, avoids the need to negotiate over that term.
121
Thereby, the rule reduces transaction costs.
While a pre-existing judicial rule may reduce transaction costs with respect to the
parties' negotiation over the scope of review for legal errors, it increases transaction
costs in other respects, most notably with respect to the choice of forum. Specifically,
uncertainty associated with the judicial rule and variations across jurisdictions require
121 These cost savings associated with the judicial rule will, of course, depend on the rule's formulation. If the
judicial rule provides for review only for "manifest disregard" of the law and the parties desire a broader review
for legal or factual errors, the savings on transaction costs are lower. In regimes permitting party-based expansions,
such a judicial default rule will still require the parties to negotiate over whether they wished to expand review
beyond that provided by the judicial standard.
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parties, with particular preferences about the scope of judicial review, to examine
variations among jurisdictions and determine which jurisdiction's set of rules supplies
the optimal regime. 122 These transaction costs have two causes: variations across
jurisdictions over the application of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard and
variations across jurisdictions over the grounds for setting aside an award.
Variations among jurisdictions over the application of the "manifest disregard of
the law" standard increase the parties' transaction costs. As noted above, one of the
difficulties of a judicially crafted rule is that courts in different jurisdictions generate
inconsistent applications of that rule. 123 For example, a court in one jurisdiction may
apply a much less exacting version of the standard than courts in other jurisdictions, or
courts in different jurisdictions may apply the standard differently to certain types of
claims such as statutory ones. These differences impact the choice of forum. Under the
FAA, the choice of arbitral forum significantly influences the venue of any post-award
review. In case of awards in domestic arbitrations or international arbitrations where
the award does not fall under the New York or Panama Conventions, the court in the
district wherein the award was made decides both whether to vacate the award and,
unless the parties have specified otherwise in the agreement, whether to confirm the
award. 124 If a party knows that one jurisdiction applies the doctrine in a manner more
favorable to that party's interests, it will seek to negotiate more aggressively for that
choice of forum in the arbitration clause. For example, a company may seek not to
arbitrate claims with its employees in the District of Columbia due to the particularly
aggressive rule articulated by the D.C. Circuit in Cole. As a result, differences across
jurisdictions in the application of the "manifest disregard of the law" rule increase
transaction costs by raising the stakes with respect to the choice of forum and forcing
the parties to investigate closely the consequences of opting for a particular situs for the
arbitration.
Variations among jurisdictions over the scope of extra-statutory grounds for
setting aside an arbitration award also increase the parties' transaction costs. As noted
above, most courts and commentators have grounded the "manifest disregard of the
law" doctrine in federal common law rather than the FAA itself.12 This methodology
has spawned not just the "manifest disregard of the law" doctrine but a host of other
non-statutory grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards. A sampling of reported opinions
reveals a plethora of other judicially crafted grounds including when the award
122 Admittedly, the parties may not bear these costs directly. Instead, lawyers may bear them, either passing
them onto the parties directly or internalizing them as part of an effort to market their services in competition
with other lawyers. Even in the latter case, however, the parties (broadly understood) still bear these costs, as
lawyers attempt to recoup their investment through higher fees. I am grateful to David Kershaw for his discussions
on this point.
123See text accompanying notes 95-106.
124 See 9 U.S.C. SS 9, 10 (specifying that an application to vacate an arbitral award may be brought in the
Federal district court "in and for the district wherein the award was made"); see also Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v.
Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (an award may be reviewed in any district proper under the general
venue statute). In cases of arbitrations whose awards fall under the New York or Panama Conventions, generous
venue rules reduce this problem. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. SS 204, 302.
125See text accompanying notes 40-57.
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(a) conflicts with strong public policy, (b) is arbitrary and capricious, (c) is completely
irrational, (d) fails to draw its essence from the underlying contract, (e) is fundamentally
unfair or (0 is arbitrary and capricious.1 26 These grounds are not uniform across the
federal circuits but, instead, vary widely. As a result, these variations further compound
the significance of the choice of forum and force the parties to investigate variations
among different forums over their setting aside grounds.
Moreover, these non-statutory doctrines effectively serve as one-way ratchets.
Under basic principles of stare decisis, a future court is unlikely to limit the nonstatutory grounds upon which a court may vacate an award once such grounds have
been recognized in a prior decision. Rather, relying on the existence of such grounds,
a court is much more likely to expand them to fashion additional ones as cases arise
containing arbitral awards with which a court is uncomfortable for one reason or
another. Over time, one would expect to see an increase in the number of and a
growing variation across circuits in the non-statutory grounds for review of arbitral
awards.
As a result, the transaction costs associated with a judicially crafted rule are
decidedly mixed. A judicial rule may reduce the transaction costs insofar as it spares the
parties the need to regulate the matter of judicial review explicitly in the agreement.
However, a judicial rule also increases the parties' transaction costs insofar as it
heightens the importance of the choice of forum due to inter-jurisdictional variations
in the application of the standard and in the uneven growth in analogous non-statutory
grounds for vacating an award.
2.

Parties

Like other institutional rules, party-based expansions ofjudicial review generate a
mixed array of transaction costs. Party-generated rules involve higher transaction costs
with respect to negotiations over the terms of expanded review itself. On the other
hand, some of the costs associated with the choice of forum generated by the judicially
crafted "manifest disregard of the law" standard are less dominant in cases of
contractually expanded judicial review. The size of this cost difference will depend,
however, on the larger system within which the parties are operating.

t26 See, e.g., Cargill, 236 E3d at 461-462 (vacatur where an award is completely irrational or in manifest
disregard of the law, recognizing possibility of "fundamental unfairness"); Williams, 197 E3d at 757-758
(recognizing five non-statutory grounds); Scott v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 141 F.3d 1007, 1017 (CAll 1998) (vacatur
where an award is arbitrary and capricious, contrary to public policy, or in manifest disregard of the law); Montes,
128 E3d at 1458-1459 (same); Tanner, 72 E3d at 239-242 (manifest disregard of the law or public policy);
Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 E2d 939, 940 (CAll 1992) (per curiam) (vacating an arbitral award for being
"arbitrary and capricious"); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 E2d 631, 633-634 (CA10 1988) (vacatur
if an award is an abuse of discretion); see generally, Poser, supra note 23, at 512-513 and n. 185-190; Stephen L.
Hayford & Scott B. Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory GroundsforJudicialReview of Commercial Arbitration Awards,
51 Disp. RESOL. J. 22, 23-26 (Oct. 1996) (collecting cases). For the suggestion that these doctrines are merely
different formulations of a single ground for vacatur, see Advest, 914 E2d at 8-9.
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A regime of party-based expansions increases some transaction costs. In contrast to
judicial expansions (or legislative expansions described below), a regime of party-based
expansions does not automatically insert an implied term of judicial review for legal
errors into the parties' arbitration agreement. As a result, the parties are required to
negotiate over matters such as whether to allow expanded judicial review for legal
errors and, if so, under what substantive standard. Negotiations over these matters
require the parties to assess the desirability of such review and the appropriate
substantive standard. These sorts of assessments require an investment of time and costs
by the parties. As a result, transaction costs rise.
In other respects, however, transaction costs under a regime of party-based
expansions of judicial review are not as high as in the case of judicial rules. Partygenerated rules are less likely to generate costs associated with the choice of forum than
judicial regimes. Since the parties control the extent to which the grounds for review
of the arbitral award may exceed those provided under the FAA, inter-jurisdictional
variations do not arise, and analogous non-statutory grounds are less likely to develop.
Moreover, the current case law on party-based expansions ofjudicial review does not
reveal sharp inter-jurisdictional variations in the application of the parties' standard in
contrast to the chaos under the judicially generated "manifest disregard of the law"
doctrine.
Party-based expansions, however, are not costless with respect to the choice of
forum. The parties must still investigate how courts have interpreted the language in
other arbitration agreements expanding judicial review. Furthermore, in light of the
explicit disagreement between courts over the enforceability of party-based
expansions, choice-of-forum considerations are now crucial.
In summary, the transaction costs associated with party-based expansions of
judicial review of arbitral awards are essentially the mirror image of those associated
with judicially crafted rules. In a regime permitting parties to expand judicial review of
arbitral awards to include legal errors, the parties must negotiate over whether to
include such review and, if so, the substantive standard that the court should apply. On
the other hand, the parties encounter relatively lower transaction costs with respect to
the choice of forum due to relatively narrower variations between courts in applying
such provisions. Legislatively authorized opt-in regimes may further reduce the costs
associated with party-based expansions by narrowing the choices available to the
parties.
3.

Legislatures

For legislative rules, the analysis of transaction costs largely tracks that of courtgenerated rules. Like a judicial rule, a legislative rule automatically implied into the
agreement may decrease transaction costs with respect to party negotiations over the
scope ofjudicial review. Likewise, a legislative rule may increase transaction costs with
respect to the choice of forum insofar as application of the legislative standard does not
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develop uniformly across jurisdictions. In at least two respects, however, the
transaction cost analysis of a legislative rule differs from that of a judicial rule.
First, the transaction costs associated with the legislative rule will depend partly on
whether the regime automatically imposes a standard of judicial review or, instead,
permits parties to opt into that regime. In regimes automatically requiring judicial
review of an award for legal error, transaction costs would be relatively low. As with a
judicial rule, such a legislative rule would effectively be implied into the parties'
agreement, thereby sparing the parties the need to dicker over the term. By contrast, in
regimes permitting the parties to opt into a system ofjudicial review of arbitral awards
for legal error, transaction costs may actually be higher. By according the parties a
modicum of choice, opt-in regimes expand the range of issues over which the parties
may negotiate in formulating their agreement. This forces the parties to assess whether
review of future awards for legal errors would be in their strategic interest. In cases
where the parties' assessments diverge, opt-in regimes will require additional
negotiation over the terms of the agreement and, thereby, increase overall transaction
costs.
Secondly, the transaction costs associated with a legal rule will be lower than those
associated with a judicial rule with respect to negotiations over the choice of forum.
While the transaction costs caused by inconsistent applications of a legislative standard
would not differ from those caused by a judicial standard, overall costs should be lower
due to a reduced risk of expansion of the vacatur grounds by analogy. As noted above,
judicial expansions of the grounds for vacatur are not confined to manifest disregard of
the law. 127 A regime of legislative rules cuts out the methodological basis for nonstatutory grounds for vacating an arbitral award and, thereby, reduces the risk that
additional grounds will be created by analogy; variations across jurisdictions over the
grounds for setting aside an award, therefore, should decline. This reduced variation
lowers the costs entailed in investigating the choice of forum. As a result, overall
transaction costs should decline in a regime where the legislature decides whether to
authorize judicial review of arbitral awards for legal error.12s
Thus, as with error costs, the transaction costs associated with a legislative rule
providing for expanded judicial review of an arbitral award seem to fall somewhere
between those for court-based and party-based rules. Like judicial rules, legislative
rules mandating substantive review of arbitral awards reduce transaction costs by
sparing the parties the need to bicker over the terms. Opt-in regimes may slightly
increase costs by requiring parties to decide whether opting into the regime is in their

127See text accompanying notes 40-57.
128 At a broad level of generality, this account of transaction costs is incomplete. A legislative rule, unlike a
judicial one, involves "start-up" costs in terms of the systemic costs involved in enacting the legislation. Moreover,
the model ignores certain biases in a legislative system where small, well-organized groups influence the process to
obtain a result favorable to their interests but sub-optimal across all cases. I am grateful to Chris Bowers for his
discussions on this point.
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strategic interest. Due to inter-jurisdictional variations in the application of the
standard, legislative costs should entail some transaction costs in the choice of forum.
These costs, however, are likely to be less severe than in the case ofjudicial rules due
to the reduced risk that variations in the non-statutory grounds for vacatur will
develop.
4.

Summary

This section considers whether courts, parties or legislatures serve as the optimal
institution for the source of a rule permitting judicial review of arbitral awards for
errors of law. It evaluates their relative competencies in three areas: legitimacy, error
costs and transaction costs.
With respect to legitimacy, courts and parties rank relatively low due to the dearth
of statutory or precedential support. Legislatures, by contrast, rank high due to the
prevailing norms, both internationally and domestically, of statutes setting forth the
grounds for vacating an arbitral award.
With respect to error costs, the record is more mixed. Judicial and, to a lesser
extent, legislative rules risk relatively higher error costs due to the difficulties in
application. Legislative rules risk slightly lower costs due to the legislature's ability to
link expanded judicial review with a requirement to give reasons. On this criterion,
party-based rules fare most favorably due to the comparatively lower risks of
misapplication, the less substantial consequences of a misapplication and the parties'
ability to link expanded review with a requirement to give reasons.
With respect to transaction costs, again the results are mixed. Judicial and
legislative rules reduce up-front transaction costs by sparing the parties the need to
investigate whether to include a term in the arbitration agreement providing for
judicial review of the award for legal errors. On the other hand, both institutions,
especially courts, generate high transaction costs related to the choice of forum due to
inter-jurisdictional variations in the rule's application. Party-based expansions display
the mirror image of the transaction costs associated with judicial and legislative rules.
Transaction costs are high insofar as the parties are required to negotiate over the
desirability of and terms governing expanded judicial review; they are lower insofar as
slimmer inter-jurisdictional variations reduce the need to investigate the choice of
forum. The following section of this article synthesizes the results of this analysis.
III. CONCLUSIONS

Having analyzed the various institutional models for extending judicial review of
arbitral awards to encompass legal errors, I offer four conclusions; three concerning the
future directions in the doctrine and one concerning a future research agenda.
First, legislatures should decide whether to expand judicial review of arbitral
awards to encompass legal errors. In the case of the FAA, this responsibility falls to
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Congress, not the federal courts or the parties. Entrusting that decision to the
legislature avoids the legitimacy deficit associated with judicially crafted or party-based
expansions of the grounds for review. It also respects institutional interests such as
controlling the development of precedent and conserving judicial resources that
underpin a legislature's desire not to permit judicial review of arbitral awards for legal
error in certain circumstances. Court-based and party-based expansions of the grounds
for review ignore these interests. Compared to a judicial rule, a legislative rule involves
relatively lower error costs and ensures initial uniformity, at a certain level of
generality, across jurisdictions. In order to avoid some of the workability problems
associated with a judicial rule, the legislative rule can be crafted so as to couple
substantive review with a requirement that arbitrators provide reasons for their
decision. Finally, the legislative rule involves low to moderate transaction costs, sparing
the parties the need to bicker over the terms of the arbitration agreement and, in
contrast to a judicial rule, involving relatively less inter-jurisdictional variation such as
the uneven growth of non-statutory grounds for vacatur.
To be sure, a legislative rule is not optimal along every factor. Many of the
shortcomings associated with judicially crafted rules might also apply in the case of a
legislative rule authorizing judicial review of arbitral awards for legal errors. Like
judicial rules, legislative rules may generate substantial error costs due to misapplication
or inconsistent application. Moreover, these error costs may be widespread due to the
universal applicability of a legislative rule. Error costs may also be difficult to reduce
due to the comparative difficulty of changing legislative rules. Inter-jurisdictional
variations in the application of the rule may generate transaction costs associated with
the choice of forum.
In order to decrease these costs while still capturing the benefits of the legislative
solution, the legislative rule should not be compulsory but, like New Jersey's regime,
should accord the parties the decision whether to opt into the system of expanded
review for legal error. An opt-in feature entrusts legislatures with the prerogative to
decide, in the first instance, whether to authorize substantive review of arbitration
awards by courts. It overcomes the difficulty of changing the rule by effectively
enabling the parties to decide whether to adopt the regime of expanded review in their
particular case. Of course, an opt-in feature will involve slightly higher transaction
costs than a mandatory legislative rule insofar as the parties themselves must decide
whether to opt into the system of expanded judicial review. However, savings in error
costs should outweigh these additional transaction costs. 12 9

I" A similar set of benefits could be obtained by an "opt out" regime, under which the legislature provides
for substantive review of the award unless the parties "opt out" of the expansive review and, instead, choose

minimal or no review. Several international arbitration laws from other countries supply examples of "opt out"
regimes. For example, under the Swiss Private International Law Act, setting aside proceedings may be excluded
or limited in arbitrations involving only non-Swiss parties. See, e.g.,Swiss I.P.R.G., art. 192.1. For a thoughtful
discussion of these types of regimes, seeChristopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated InternationalArbitration Awards,

11 AM. R v.

INT'L ARB.

(2000) (forthcoming, copy on file with author).
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Secondly, courts should not enforce party-based expansions of the grounds for
review. In the federal context, this means that cases such as Gateway and Syncor were
wrongly decided. Party-based expansions impinge on certain institutional interests that
might underpin a legislative decision not to permit judicial review of arbitral awards for
legal error. Where the applicable Arbitration Act also supplies the basis for the court's
subject matter jurisdiction, party-based expansions also collide with prohibitions on
parties manufacturing the courts' subject matter jurisdiction. Party-generated
expansions of the grounds for review also entail substantial risks exemplified by Syncor
and Gateway that the courts will conduct a far more scrutinizing review than the parties
130
ever intended.
Thirdly, courts should curtail their spontaneously generated use of the manifest
disregard of the law doctrine. In the federal context, this means that the
development of the "manifest disregard of the law" doctrine in the case law
following the dicta in Wilko has been entirely misguided. Court-based expansions,
like party-based ones, intrude on legislative prerogatives that might underpin a
decision not to permit judicial review of arbitral awards for legal errors. They
undermine stability in the arbitration regime by creating uncertainty about the
scope of the exception and creating the conditions under which additional nonstatutory grounds can be developed by analogy. Decisions such as Halligan and Cole
demonstrate that the purportedly narrow review of awards for "manifest disregard
of the law" can easily evolve into a more intrusive full-scale review of the award for
legal errors.
To set the stage for this reform agenda, the U.S. Supreme Court should send a
strong signal that Congress controls the grounds upon which an arbitral award may be
set aside under the FAA. In matters such as this one, involving the proper
interpretation of the FAA, review is only likely where a clear division of authority
emerges among the federal courts of appeals. 131 Under that rule, the current split over
the enforceability of party-based expansions provides the most promising area for
Supreme Court intervention. In other areas, although sharp disagreements have not
emerged, review is not out of the question. Though appellate courts superficially recite
the same "manifest disregard of the law" standard, a comparison of cases such as Cole,
Halligan and Williams suggest that, beyond this abstract formulation, their applications
of the standard differ sharply. The latent dissensus among the courts of appeals over the
grounds for vacatur of "non-domestic" awards made in the United States provides
another ripe area for Supreme Court intervention.
Fourthly, beyond these specific doctrinal conclusions, this article points to several
additional directions for future research into an institutional account of arbitration law.
Future study should provide a more systematic account of various institutions'
130 Conversely, however, under a model not taking legitimacy into account, the case for party-based control,
on purely economic grounds, is strong. This would particularly be true in a party-based regime in which the
parties coupled review for legal error with a requirement that arbitrators give reasons for their decisions.
131 See S.Ct. R. 10 (describing the grounds upon which a petition for a writ of certiorari may be granted).
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respective competencies and an objective system for measuring their capacities. 132 The
account should consider not just courts, parties and legislatures but also other actors,
particularly arbitral institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce and
appellate arbitral tribunals.

132 For a scholarly effort to consider one level of the institutional debate, see Stephen Walt, Decision by Division:
The ContractarianStructure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 369 (1999).
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